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Ellen Lewin

Commodifying SameSex Marriage in the
United States:
Medicalization, Morality,
and Mental Health
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In the spring of 2005,
the membership of the
American
Psychological
Association
approved
a
resolution backing same-sex
marriage "in the interest of
maintaining and promoting
mental health." Both this
organization and its sister
professional
group,
the
American
Psychiatric
Association,
have
long
attended to the mental health
ramifications
of
homosexuality, and famously,
back in the early 1970S, the
psychiatrists voted to remove
homosexuality from the list of
mental disorders enumerated
in
its
Diagnostic
and
Statistical Manual (DSM).l
That decision, along with the
earlier work of the Kinsey
researchers
and
the
revolutionary psychological
studies conducted by Evelyn
Hooker, has long been
heralded as having paved the
way for gay and lesbian people
to dispute characterizations of
their sexuality as clinically
abnormal.2
With
this
assurance that homosexuality
did not stem from an
inherently disordered psyche,
lesbians and gay men and
other
members
of
sexual/gender minorities have

2

Commodifying Same-Sex Marriage
been able not only to seek relief from persecution, but to
launch an ambitious movement for civil rights.
Judgments about the mental health of non-heterosexuals have
clearly played a part in the gains made over the last few decades and it
would be foolish to minimize the power of such professional asse;sments
to influence public opinion-or the degree to which such views are
~emselves shaped by changing public opinion. But of late, a somewhat
different ~gument about lesbian/gay rights and mental health, specifically
surrounding demands for same-sex marriage, has surfaced in the United
States, and I would like to raise some concerns about how these issues are
coming to be deployed. An article by psychiatrist Robert Kertzner and
anthropologist Gilbert Herdt, for example, argues forcefully that same-sex
couples should have access to legal marriage because of the mental health
benefits they would thereby realize. Although this position resonates with
many mental health professionals, I believe it demands careful and critical
examination.3
I will contend that while estimations of the mental health
adv~tages of ~arriage may have some strategic utility in approaching
particular audiences, e.g., psychologists and psychiatrists, a political
strate!?' that puts. mental health at its center is ill-considered and
potentially productive of questionable alliances. I base my position on
conce~s about what scholars, clinicians, and activists mean by "mental
health, as .well as on my alarm over a growing convergence between
arguments lo favor of marriage equality for same-sex couples and the
larger .marriage promotion movement that has surfaced in the United
Sta~e~ lo re~nt years in close association with efforts to "reform" welfare
POlICIes. I WIll argue, as well, that these associations reflect a growing
comm?dification o~ marriage and mental health as both come increasingly
to be linked to relative affluence.
Beyond ~oncerns about these findings themselves, I am
uncomfortable WIth .any approach to lesbian and gay rights that uses a
mental health paradIgm to frame notions of entitlement and citizenship
even as I am. personally sympathetic to the struggle by gay and lesbia~
people to gam access to legal marriage.4 As a cultural anthropolOgist
whose work has long addressed that complex of ideas behaviors and
symbols tha~ compri~e what we usually gloss as "family"' and "kinship," I
take a keen lOterest lo the ways these categories are defined in different
cul~ral contexts. My approach stands in contrast to trends in queer
stu~es that have tended to neglect this area of behavior and identity
Particularly at the.. level real life, reflecting an assumption that
transgresSIve sexualIties, however they are defined, are always already
separat~~ or should. be separable from the mundane social domain of
domestiCI~ and famI!Y.s !he ~~phasis in this body of work typically lies
on sexualIty and desIre, ImplICItly separating these domains from other
elements of daily life and identity.
.Some scholars have gone further and have sharply criticized efforts
of lesbIans and gay men to achieve any of the insignia of family legitimacy6
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or have sought, with little regard for empirical evidence, to cas~ queer
families as axiomatically subversive. 7 Commentators on both SIdes of
debates about queerness and assimilation voice surprisingly similar
arguments, drawn in my view on deeply essentialized assumptio~s about
the nature of homosexuality as a fixed and predictable set of behavIOrs and
desires. 8 In both cases, departure from heterosexual convention is
understood as rooted in specific non-normative sexual proclivities, urges
that may be seen as disordered and evil by opponents of gay rights or that
may be valorized by their proponents, but which in ei~er case are th?ught
to be displayed in a range of sexual and cultural behaVIors at odds WIth all
sorts of conventionality. Such positions amount to what I have labeled
"queer fundamentalism" when espoused by theorists who position
themselves as non-heterosexual.9
The resultant myopia concerning lesbian/gay life and families has
meant, on one level, that lesbian and gay social worlds have long been
construed as almost completely lacking in family or kinship connections,
except insofar as the language of relatedness is used metaphori~lly or
applied through "choice" to friends. to Prev~ent imag~ of lesb~an/gay
cultures and communities are of bounded, mwardly-onented umverses,
the frontiers around them understood as a sort of no-man's land in which
nearly aU fear to tread. Marriage and family simply don't have a place in
this terrain.
But questioning the use of mental health paradigms as a way to
argue for equal access to marriage need not be inspired by ho~tility toward
same-sex marriage or repudiation of the desires of some lesbIans and gay
men to claim the rewards of domesticity. Nor need it ignore the fact that
mental health arguments may have particular resonance with some
audiences we may wish to reach and thus have a particular, though
opportunistic, effectiveness. Nonetheless, the prospect of using same-~ex
marriage as part of a larger effort to enhance the mental health of l~sbJa.n
and gay people is a disturbing one, as well as an approach that I belIeve IS
doomed to backfire.
What are the arguments about same-sex marriage and mental
health? Celia Kitzinger and Sue Wilkinson" have provided us with an
excellent review of one strand of the mental health argument, one that
emphasizes what might be called the oppression position, i.e., that lack of
access to legal marriage is a form of oppression that has a range of
deleterious effects on mental health, a claim that recalls positions taken in
opposition to racial segregation, notably influenci~g the 1?54 Supreme
Court decision in Bl"Own u. Board of Educahon, whIch outlawed
segregation in public schools." The majority opini~n in that ~se h~ld that
segregation was wrong because it made black children feel lOfenor and
hence caused them psychological and intellectual harm, a judgment
heavily influenced by Kenneth and Mamie Clark's famous doll pr~ference
studies.'3 Whether such research is directly applicable to the expenence of
lesbians and gay men certainly merits further investigation, though some
parallels between various forms of discrimination obviously exist.
4
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. Th~se arguments-tha.t discrimin~tion generates pathology-clearly
c?nfhct WIth efforts, foundational to clrums to gay and lesbian civil rights
smce the 1950S, to understand homosexual people Oike other members of
sti~atized minor!ties) as fundamentally psychologically healthy.14 The
notio~ that exclusIOn from key social institutions is primarily a form of
emotio~al abuse to which stigmatized persons fall victim cannot be the
foundation of a strategy to gain equal rights, Kitzinger and Wilkinson
argue.
But other approaches to same-sex marriage and mental health have
been ~spired not by arguments about the harmful consequences of
op?reSSlOn, but by a comparison with heterosexual marriage and a
:elIance on stances t~en in support of marriage that have been deployed
m a. r.ange of c?ntexts m the US-what we might call the happy marriage
poslhon: Despite contr~~ctory data a~out the mental health implications
of marna?e, these positions accept WIth little qualification the assertion
that mamage has affirmatively positive emotional effects on both men and
women, and that same-sex couples ought to be able to share these
benefits.'5
Attempts to ground the quest for equality in the mental health
benefi~ of marriage inevitably draw on data that only indirectly speak to
the cucu~st~ces of lesbian and gay couples. The marriage and
partne:shlp nghts offered to same-sex couples in the several European
coun!Iies ?enerally do not offer complete equality with heterosexual
mamage, msofar, as ~any of these countries place some restrictions on
same-sex .couples abtlIty to adopt children or avail themselves of some
other en~itlements associated with marriage. 16 Denmark was the first
country (m 1989) ~o es~ablish some sort of same-sex registration option,
but ~ther. countries. m Europe quickly followed suit, first across
ScandmaVl~ and then m the Netherlands and Belgium (where both samesex ~nd dlffere.nt-sex couples now have the option to choose either
m~.age or regIStered partnership). A range of other arrangements now
eXist .m France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Fully equal access to
mru:na?e was extend~d to gay and lesbian couples in Canada in 2003 in
Spam 1D 2005, and m. South Africa in 2006. Some European countries
~ffer .a r:m ge of regIStration provisions, none of which are called
I mama~e and some of which also offer a legal connection perceived as
~s weighty than marriage to heterosexual couples, though there is
eVlde~ce that ~ome couples actively view these unions as "marriage"
sometimes adding ~r.emonial elements to the registration process to ma;k
that status.'7 In addition, a number of jurisdictions around the world will
ackn owledge ~r accord some level of recognition to same-sex marriages
an d partnerships enacted elsewhere.'8
In 0~ United States, beginning with Berkeley California in 1984
!on:ze mumclpal ~d state jurisdictions have approved measures that offe;
anous sorts of ngh~ that approximate some features of marriage to
sam~-s~x (and som~times opposite-sex) unmarried couples variously
conslSting of domestic partner registration, extension of som~ employee
5
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benefits (most notably health insurance) to same-sex partners, and the
ability to claim legal standing that would permit particular kinds of
litigation.'9 At the same time, in the US, a substantial number of public
and private employers have begun to offer benefits to the same-sex
partners of employees, though such efforts have been hampered in
locations where anti-gay marriage measures have been passed by voters
and have, in some instances, occasioned consumer boycotts by right-wing
constituencies.
As of this writing, three states in the US-Massachusetts, California,
and Connecticut-have made marriage legal for same-sex couples, though
the entitlements such couples can claim stop at the state borders. 20 With
the impending threat of a constitutional amendment ~Massachu.se~) and
a ballot initiative (California) that defines marnage as hIDIted to
heterosexual unions, couples can hardly settle into their marriages
confidently. A constantly changing roster of states offers some variant of
"marriage lite," including Vermont's civil union mechanism. The legal
standing of all of these measures, at least in the US, remains quite fluid at
the same time that more countries are establishing some sort of
recognition for same-sex marriages, whether they move to institute such
processes themselves or merely to recogn~e unions solemniz~d. elsew~ere.
Brazil, for example, instituted a policy m 2003 of recogntzmg uruons
performed elsewhere for purposes ofimmigration. 2 1
All of this flux- the situation changes almost day to day-and the
shallow time frame within which legally recognized same-sex marriage or
partnership has existed, mean that arguments that marriage has any
particular mental health effects on same-sex co~ples can. only be made
indirectly and with heavy reliance on rhetOriC. That IS, we cannot
empirically assess how marriage affects the mental ~ealth status of
married same-sex couples over time when there are Virtually no such
people available to investigate. Further, since what is considered marriage
or what particular couples interpret as marriage vary across a wide range
of legal and ceremonial arrangements, there is n~ way to legitimat~ly
compare the experience of same-sex couples WIth that of mamed
heterosexuals.
In the absence of direct evidence, some proponents of same-sex
marriage have based their positions on analogies drawn from studies of
heterosexual couples, most notably the work of Linda .Waite and her
associates 22 which claim that both mental and phYSical health are
enhanced by legal marriage. In other instances, argumen~ i.n favor of the
right to marry have been based on the pre~umed pO~ltive. effects of
achieving public recognition for such committed relationships. !hese
approaches depend on previous findings, l~rgely based "on n.arrativ; or
anecdotal evidence that speak to the benefiCial effects of commg out on
feelings of well-b~ing and self-esteem (to mention just some of the
variables that might be mentioned) a~d. others .that su~est .that
community support helps to sustain and solIdify commltted relationships.
6
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THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE
. . !here is an enormous corpus of research from a range of
discIplines-psychology, economics, sociology, history, and others-that
addresses the advantages (heterosexual) marriage may provide couples
and spokes~ersons for this set of comparisons draw on a range of finding~
to m~e theIr case. Some of these data appear to present solid evidence for
the VIew that particular indi.cators of mental health (as well as physical
heal~) can be correlated WIth marital status in particular populations
studied under specific circumstances. For example, a number of
reseru:chers have conducted longitudinal studies that follow the
expenences of those wh? marry a~d those who do not, as indicated by self;ep?rt. 23 In these studIes, baselIne data on a variety of mental health
mdicators are compared with outcomes after various marital pathways.
These researche;s generally c?ncl.ude ~at stabl~ marriage (at least during
a five-~ear penod. of examInation) IS assocIated with freedom from
depress~on, expressIOns ?f happiness with life in general, self-esteem, and
other di~ers.e measures Including personal mastery, autonomy, having a
purpose In life, and personal growth. In contrast, those who did not marry
dunng the research period or who married and then separated or divorced
showed corresponding deficits in these same areas."'!
The direction of these findings is not uniform, nor do assertions
~bout why such advantages occur necessarily argue for the same causal
hnks. ~e explanations Waite and Gallagher offer for marriage being
benefiCIal to mental health (among other areas) variously focus on the
salutary effects of intim~cy and emotional support, the security gained
from ~e greater coI?mItr~'lent presumed to accompany legal marriage
(even m the fac~ of high divorce rates), the protection spouses offer each
ot:h er from phYSIcal hazards (though this argument usually identifies the
WIfe ~s the p~otector of both spouses), and often, the economic advantages
assocIated WIth marriage .. Whether any of these attributes, but especially
those. connected to finanCIal wherewithal, are causes or effects of marriage
remams a matter of controversy.'s
Obviously, many questions can be raised about the credibility of
such data, based as they are on aggregate epidemiological data or self
reports and responses to questionnaires administered in artificial settings
not least about their appli~tion to the immense complexity of real life:
~o~ably the most compellIng set of criticisms of these conclusions raise
e Issue of how to evaluate "good: ver~us "bad" marriages, particularly as
we have become aware of pe~asIve VIolence in the latter- however they
e defined. Num~rous studIes of domestic violence reveal that class
~~ors, and especIally extreme poverty, are linked to high rates of
ence. The P?or a:e also. the group least likely to marry, thus suggesting
at couples WI~ hIgher Incomes may have greater chances of marital
success, along WIth lesser vulnerability to domestic violence .•6
In other words, those who are destined to be able to manage the
most successful marriages are, in fact, the very same population most
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likely to marry. Those with fewer economic resources, already at risk for
domestic violence and other hazards that might have negative emotional
impacts, generally do not find their way into the statistics on marital
mental health. Similarly, it might be argued that those with better overall
mental stability and other emotional qualities that might contribute to a
harmonious marital life are already more likely to marry and to have
successful marriages than those individuals with mental health deficits.
Selection factors, in other words, may account for the correlations between
mental health indicators and marriage, despite researchers' claims that
their longitudinal designs eliminate such biases.
In an effort to directly address the experience of same-sex couples,
psychologist Lawrence Kurdek has compared gay and lesbian cohabiting
couples with heterosexual married couples along such dimensions of
"relationship quality" as intimacy, autonomy, equality, constructive
problem solving, and barriers to leaving the marriage. He then assesses
the relationship between these variables and two "relationship outcomes"
during a five-year longitudinal study. While the overall results indicate
that relationship quality and relationship outcome, i.e., continuation or
dissolution, are linked similarly for heterosexual and homosexual couples,
numerous methodological problems can be raised in trying to extrapolate
from heterosexual married couples to gay men and lesbians. Like other
studies of its kind, Kurdek's involved a rather homogeneous, non-random
sample of well-educated subjects and depended on self reporting for its
findings. More critical, of course, is the absence of any direct way to
compare the possible effects of marital status on two populations whose
legal relationship to marriage is totally different. Nor does this approach
allow for an examination of how gender itself may shape perceptions of
relationship quality.'7
THE CASE FOR COMING OUT
Claims about the benefits of coming out are largely based on studies
conducted by clinicians.' s Related research shows a range of deleterious
effects of concealing one's sexual identity, including an elevated risk for
suicide, HIV infection, and exposure to sexual violence.'9 They draw on
knowledge about how people experience all forms of stigma, including the
notion, famously put forward by Erving Goffman,30 that stigmatized
individuals must devote considerable energy to "managing" fueir identities
and to assessing the risk in particular situations of allowing fueir identities
to become known. Stigmatized identities, this literature indicates, "spoil"
or supersede other aspects of identity, and eifuer preventing discovery or
manipulating it in some way becomes an overriding preoccupat~on for
such individuals. But even as fears about negative responses to commg out
are warranted in many circumstances,3 1 individuals often report disclosure
to be a liberating experience fuat enables fuem to validate their sense of
self.3'
.
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Beyond the clinical data, the celebration of coming out as a
necessary feature of forming a stable homosexual identity and the
testimonials that are typical features of personal accounts seem to be
~e~e~ by .the ~alue NOrth. American culture places on honesty and
mdiVIdual mtegnty. Along WIth these values, the individualistic ethos that
is particularly central to the culture of the US prizes the authenticity of
personal narratives as unassailable evidence of experience and hence
"~th".33 By the same token, concealing one's "true" identity is widely
believed to be both personally unhealthy and potentially harmful to others,
as accounts of members of stigmatized populations who "pass" as
members of more esteemed groups amply demonstrate.
While such experiences may .not always be analogous, the images of
the black person who passes as white, of the Jew who allows him/herself
to be taken for pentile, an~ the homosexual who pretends to be straight
nearly ~ways ~nvoke no.tions that passing betrays one's family and
community, typically leading to tragic results. Such outcomes may occur
on a personal lev~l and be ~emonstrated by displays of pathological, and
even self-d~truc!l~e, behaVIor. They also may be understood to be more
communal In their Impact, as the person who passes risks alienation from
the. community o~ ~ose with ,,:,hom the stigmatized identity is shared,
whl.le never establishing secure hnks with the community to which he/she
asplres. 34
.Such jud~ents are supported by the evidence of personal
narratives of vanou.s so~-confessions of those who have passed and
come ~o regret .thelr actions as cowardly, and testimonials about the
exultation expenenced by those who own up to their "true" identities. In
fact, the coming-out story has been one of the central cultural devices that
has fr~ed the gay and lesbian rights movement in the West· it takes a
narrative form that is distinctive in some features, but that alsd resembles
the larger genre of the bildungsroman. 35
The ~ncritical val.orization of "coming out" assumes that identities
are fixed, smgu1~, .and Inherent to individuals who must be conscious of
th~m. Secrecy, hiding-even behaviors that might constitute a wish for
pnvacy-are e.xcoriated in this discourse as concealment and evidence of
shame, sometimes .constructed. as "i~tern~ized homophobia." Rarely do
we rea~ ~path~tic a~ounts In which discretion about one's sexual (or
other) I.dentity might elt~er hav~ a positive outcome, e.g., by allowing for
the mamtenanc:e of.parti~ular kinds of relationships, enhancing earning
power, or of situations In which "openness" results from pressure to
conform tha.t compe~s collusion with identity definitions imposed by
oth~rs. In. ~IS analYSIs of gay adolescents' uses of silence in their life
stones, ':Vil!lam Leap has observed that condemnation of the "closet" may
ob~cun~ Its ~mportance not only as a site of denial, but also as a location in
which a stmpler and less threatening form of gay experience" can be
f!act:d. "If the closet is part. ~f gay c~lture, then the closet, too, has a
gu ~e-a language that pnVIleges szlence over speech, restraint over
expreSSion, concealment over cooperation, safety over risk. "36
9

Mental health-based arguments in favor of same-sex marriage
rights raise concerns, then, in terms of how such positions are derived and
argued. They are based not on solid evidence, but on a set of analogies and
generalizations themselves drawn from questionable sources. They rest on
assumptions that same-sex partnerships are readily comparable in key
dimensions to heterosexual marriages, and on extrapolations from the
subjective body of knowledge provided by clinical accounts of coming out
and bolstered by popular coming-out and other personal narratives. And
they assume a particular sort of relationship between marriage and mental
health that, as we shall see, is far from transparent.
WHAT'S THE OPPOSITE OF MENTAL HEALTH?
Besides the problem of drawing analogies between the as yet
virtually non-existent phenomenon of same-sex marriage and either
heterosexual marriage or the coming out experience, the mental health
paradigm generates some more specific concerns as well. The most
obvious and disturbing image is of gay and lesbian people, who in the vast
majority of locations are now, and have always been, ineligible for legal
marriage, being therefore less well-endowed with "mental health" than
married people. Are they more prone to psychological disturbances merely
because of their unmarried status?
If we take the idea of a link between marriage and mental health to
its logical conclusion, it seems to me that we find ourselves moving toward
undoing the positive impact of the decision by the American Psychiatric
Association to de-pathologize homosexuality. Under these conditions, it
would not be the direction of sexual desire or the disruptions of
conventional gender norms that would label homosexuals "sick," but their
lack of participation in the institution of marriage. As circular as such
reasoning may seem, there is sufficient hostility to gay and lesbian people
today to make access to such an easy form of stigma an attractive
alternative to seemingly more toxic forms of bias.
Attempts to ascertain levels of "mental health" and to connect them
with "marriage" are problematic as well when we consider how imprecise
those terms are. Whose marriages are we talking about, and how do we
account for the mental health benefits they allegedly confer? That is,
assuming that a generic condition known as "marriage" has some positive
effects on mental health, what is the mechanism by which this is thought
to occur? Which aspects of mental health are affected? I can imagine a
number of benefits conferred by marriage that would be difficult to
extrapolate to non-heterosexuals: the communal recognition ~at
accompanies the change from single to married, or the fact that marned
couples conventionally include wage-earning men and thus are better off
than individuals on their own or two women living together. Can we
assume that marriage bestows the same benefits across divisions of so~ial
class, race, and ethnicity-or across the many other cultural boundaries
that crisscross US society?
10
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Even the most earnest advocates of the benefits of marriage are
hard-pressed to unravel the distinction between the institution's economic
advantages and the salutary effects they claim it has on mental and
physical health. These economic benefits can easily be traced to the effects
of having an employed male contributing to the household; given the lower
rates of marriage among the poor, this male is likely to be at least middleclass. But do they result from or cause the positive mental health outcomes
these researchers claim to have found? How much emotional distress, one
cannot help but wonder, is the product of insecure financial
circ~stances-downward mobility, deindustrialization, the growing
prormnence of employment in the service sector. None of these conditions
pro~otes mental health, and none of them are positively associated with
marn~ge rates. Some of the .s~holars in ~is field give passing attention to
these I~sues,.but none are Wlllmg to conSider how thoroughly their images
of mantal bliss are grounded in economic security.37 The enthusiasm with
which some of the pro-marriage scholars invoke the economic benefits of
mar.riage comes perilously close to sounding like a get-rich-quick scheme
for I?stantly.solving the financial predicaments of many currently living
outside marriage.
Then. there ar~ ~actors associated with heterosexual marriage that
may have either pOSitive or negative effects; here I am thinking of the
consequence~ ?f the institution's intersection with conventional gender
roles. Does hvmg under the sway of these norms contribute to "mental
health" equally for men and women, and how would this translate in a
same:sex partnership? Those who celebrate the mental health benefits of
marnage have been eager to sweep aside the visionary work of Jessie
Bernard, who more than 30 years ago argued that marriages needed to be
understood as ~iffe~ent institutions for men and women.38 In her reading,
men ~enefited m direct ways from the services of women while women
were. likely to suffer in various ways from their subordinated roles in these
r.elationships. W?ile lines of authority in marriage are by no means as
linear as convention framed them before the influences of feminism began
to be felt and women's employment became a virtual necessity for all but
the most affluent families, the continuing prevalence of domestic violence
d an. unequ~ division of household labor both speak to the ongoing
mequality that IS a feature of at least some heterosexual marriages. 39
Of course, those couples who do have significant economic
resources are precisely those who can buy themselves out of some of the
more oppressive manifestations of gender inequality. If service employees
can ~e engage~ to undertake the more onerous aspects of domesticitycleanmg, cooking, laundry, and child care-then it is likely that stresses
caused by female subordin~tion will fade into the background, even as
women, by and. large, ~ontinue to have major responsibility for making
sure all the .servlce pr?VJders complete their work. But perhaps that is not
the mechamsm by whICh marriage confers its apparent benefits. We do not
really know.
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And that is just looking at the United States. Is "mental health"
everywhere measured by the same criteria? Do all cultures assess it
according to individual attributes, or are there locations where we must
look for a more communal reading of "mental health"? Medical
anthropologists can attest to the fact that the assessment of mental health
and illness is accomplished very differently in different cultures, with stark
disparities cross-culturally in the numbers of persons diagnosed with
particular conditions. 4o Do the mental health advantages presumed to be
associated with marriage also accrue where other systems of marriage,
such as polygamy, are normative? Do they apply in cultures where
marriage operates as a mechanism for ordering social, economic, and
political alliances rather than a site for intimacy and emotional support?
MEDICALIZING RELATIONSHIPS

Framing equality in terms of "mental health" depends on a
paradigm of medicalization, a form of social control that historically has
rarely been employed in the service of disempowered or marginalized
populations. 41 Feminist scholars have long documented, for example, the
ways in which the medicalization of women's ordinary reproductive
experience can have a variety of pernicious effects on their social status,
and arguably on their mental health as well. These processes of
medicalization undermine women's ability to trust their own embodied
experience, leading to soaring rates of interventions, at least some of
which are not medically necessary. They also institutionalize medical
surveillance over the most personal domains of life, obstructing women's
ability to make decisions on their own behalf.42
Perhaps it is not surprising that a medical model of the right to
marry would emerge in the present historical moment when such
technologies as Viagra, assisted reproduction, prenatal diagnostic
techniques, cosmetic and gender reassignment surgeries, and other
interventions British sociologist Ken Plummer has dubbed "the
medicalizing of intimacy"43 are proliferating and arguably having their
own effects on sexuality and marriage. Increasingly, variations that were
simply part of the routine fabric of life have moved into a domain that
makes them "treatable." As some advocates for the disabled have argued,
the availability of prenatal diagnostic methods for conditions that may not
be life-threatening may lead to a devaluation of all human variability, and
even of cultures shared by persons with specific conditions (e.g.,
deafness).44
Comparable arguments have surrounded the ubiquitous use of
prenatal diagnosis to determine the sex of the fetus, whiclJ in a number of
countries (e.g., India and China) have led to selective abortion of (usually)
female offspring.45 Are "imperfections" of any sort to be tolerated, or
should they all be obliterated by the power of medical treatment? Will
women who re.fuse to undergo diagnostic procedures or undertake
therapies indicated by the results of diagnoses be held responsible for
12

Commodifying Same-Sex Marriage
producing disabled offspring?46 And does the availability of such
technologies, at least to those who can afford to employ them, pose the
prospect of embodying class distinctions in previously unimaginable
ways?47
.
Me~calization ,Presents particularly problematic issues for gay
ng~ts as It expan~ mto the area of sexual functioning.48 Use of the
vanous pharmaceutical products that have taken aim at so-called erectile
dysfunctio~ ~ presumably fr~el.y chosen, but as these technologies become
mo;e sophisticated and specialized, will that always be the case? How will
theIr. expanded us~ affect popular understandings of "normal" sexual
functi?nmg? How big ~ s~ep might it be from "treating" sexual dysfunction
to seemg all sexual vanation, as well as the emotional fabric of sexuality in
medicalized tenns?49
'
Medicaliz.ation al~o r:uses ye~ other worrisome questions that hinge
on the temporality of SCientific findings. What if later research contradicts
the data that support the salutary effects of marriage? Do claims to the
~ental health benefits of marriage then evaporate, going the same way as
diets ~as~d on heavy consumption of red meat? In other words, can we
only JUstify demands for same-sex marriage rights as long as we can
demonstrate a correlation between such rights and good mental health?
. Even if we forego a broad cross-cultural survey and look only at the
Umted States, we can se~ that notion~ of who is mentally ill vary
enonnously, even over relatively short pen ods of time. A recent survey, for
example,. suggested that more than half of Americans will develop a
me~tal disorder ove~ their lifetimes.50 And the DSM, which as I mentioned
earlie~ de-pathololP~ed homosexuality in its 1973 edition (thereby
declanng several mIlhon people instantly "cured"), has, for the most part,
adde~ r~the: than subtracted mental disorders to its inventory of
psychiatric diagnoses. The total number of disorders listed amounted to
some 60 categories in 1952, but now boasts about 300 conditions and
syndromes. ~an w~ expect that homosexuality or failure to marry might
not turn up mto th~s powerful compendium as time goes on? Both mental
health and mental illness are moving targets, shifting, some would argue,
to meet ~e pressures of the pharmaceutical industry or to coincide with
the reqUlrements of health insurance.51
WHAT ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS?
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correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks."52 Historian Nancy Cott has shown that marriage has long
functioned as a marker of citizenship in the US; this clause in the
Declaration speaks directly to the central problem that exclusion from
marriage poses for lesbians and gay men, as it once did for enslaved people
and Asian immigrants. 53 Does a mental health focus really enhance our
ability to deploy a human rights paradigm?
While I have some discomfort with the universalizing language of
human rights discourse, my mention of the paradigm is not just
hypothetical. Such language, rather than prognostications about mental
health, in fact penneates legal decisions that have been made in support of
same-sex marriage or other rights of lesbian and gay people. In the 2004
decision in the Massachusetts case, Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health, for example, the justices explained their ruling in support of samesex marriage as follows:
Barred access to the protections, benefits, and
obligations of civil marriage, a person who
enters into an intimate, exclusive Ullion with
another of the same sex is arbitrarily deprived
of membership in one of our community's most
rewarding and cherished institutions. That
exclusion
is
incompatible
with
the
constitutional principles of respect for
individual autonomy and equality under law. 54
Similarly, the Ontario court that ruled in Halpern v. Canada in
2003, establishing the foundation for equal access to marriage in Canada,
stated in part,
Exclusion from marriage - a fundamental
societal institution - perpetuates the view that
same-sex relationships are less worthy of
recognition than opposite-sex relationships. In
doing so, it offends the dignity of persons in
same-sex relationships.55

. . Another concern speaks to longer range strategies. As Kitzinger and
Wilkinson argue, the use of a mental health paradigm draws our attention
away fro~ mo~els that would be more appropriate to the matter of samesex m~age rIghts. The language of the 1948 United Nations Universal
Declaration of .Human Rights might help us think about the issue of equal
access to mamage as a matter of equality before the law and the right of
each person to legal recognition, both listed as inalienable human rights in
the do~ument. The ~eclar~tion also includes the following: "No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary Interference with his privacy, family, home or

In other words, the human rights-inflected language of
fundamental human dignity can be used to craft arguments that are
convincing in judicial contexts. Like Gayatri Spivak's notion of "strategic
essentialism," such appeals may be intellectually suspect but nevertheless
are evocative and effective. 56 The deployment of mental health is not the
only argument that can be used opportunistically to capture the sympathy
of an important audience.
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.
The language of mental health tends to invoke images of domestic
pnvacy that I would argue obscure the workings of the "matrix of power
rela~ons" in ~hich marri.age is actually embedded. 57 Yes, family and
mantal dynamIcs unfold In spaces that are private, but they also are
shaped by laws and politics, as well as by the inequalities that exist
between parents and children, between men and women, and between
groups that are positioned differently according to race economic status
~d o~er distinctions. The language of mental health' instead implies ~
distanc10g between the public domain and the world of emotions, as
~ough ~e latter unfol~s only in the realm of the private and domestic. It
IS essential. to recognIze that the struggle for same-sex marriage has
blossomed 10 a complex environment in which ideas about identities and
the claims to citizenship they make possible intersect with notions of
rights ~d responsib~ities. These dynamics cannot be captured by models
that ?Ifurcate th~ pnvate and public; rather they are sites where these
seemIngl~ OPPOSIn~ d~m~s .are .most .intimately connected. Marriage,
after all, IS the SOCIal Institution In whIch a private sexual relationship
receives public recognition.
I am similarly suspicious of arguments for same-sex marriage that
frame the entire debate as a quest for concrete benefits such as health
coverage, pensions, and child custody, arguments that bear a marked
resemblance to the mental health rationale. Clearly, those (and more than
1,000 other) spe~ific entitlemen~s a:e, in the US, tied directly to marriage.
But would marnage cease to eXIst If these benefits were distributed in a
more equitable fas?ion? ~ll?1 of us ~till dream that the US will one day
enter the commumty of cIVIlIzed nations that offers its citizens national
health care, but would provision of universal health coverage really mean
that there. would b.e no reason to get married? Has anything like that
happened In countries that do offer such services?
Ethnographic research on same-sex commitment ceremonies that
were undertaken in. the complete a?sence of any sort of legal recognition
sh?wed that matenal benefits, while not to be disparaged, are not the
pnI?ary reason that people ~hoose t~ marry. Instead, couples' accounts
1Odi~ted that the~ were making a va~lety of sometimes overlapping, even
se~mIngly co!ltradIct~ry, statements In framing their desire to make their
umons ~ubhc and. In formulating the specific ritual content of the
ceremon~e~. The ntu~s allowed them to articulate membership in
com~umties .of all Strip~s, connections to spiritual forces and religious
tradition.s, clrums to ethmc and family ties- all intentions that transcended
boundanes between sexually-defined populations. These couples wanted
to make particul~ kinds of statements about themselves to the wider
world, an~ matenal benefits served more to ratify their stances than to
de~ne therr goals. For example, gifts might have monetary value, but they
mrunly w~rk to demons~ate that the couple is really what they say they
are-marned. Couples mlg~t perceive their mental health-experienced as
a general sense of wellbeIng-to have been positively affected by their
15
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weddings, but their objectives in staging these events go beyond these
fleeting rewards.sB
MENTAL HEALTH AS DURABLE GOOD

Those who have created the current uproar about the status and
future of marriage in the US have pointed to divorce rates, out-of-wedlock
births, cohabitation, and other social behavior as indicators of the collapse
of marriage as a central social institution and have suggested a host of
other misfortunes that will accompany that collapse.59 However, the most
sensible voices to enter the debate have demonstrated that marriage has
not lost its importance, but rather has changed its meaning in the past few
decades. In a recent article that addresses prognostications about the
"future of marriage," sociologist Andrew Cberlin draws on evidence from a
wide range of investigations to show that marriage has become not the
entry point to adult life, but a valued marker of success and achievement.
Cherlin argues that marriage has in fact grown in prestige, as evidenced by
the visibility of elaborate weddings couples pay for themselves. Couples
thereby demonstrate that they have reached the point in life where they
are successful and stable enough to celebrate a marriage. 60
These findings are echoed in the work of Kathryn Edin and Maria
Kefalas, whose 2005 study of low-income mothers (white, black and
Latino) reveals that marriage is highly valued, indeed to such a degree that
poor women fear taking such a momentous commitment lightly by
marrying "only" because of getting pregnant. Even when they establish a
household with their child's father and say they intend to marry him, they
choose not to do so until both have reached a level of financial stability and
have enough money to "do it right." Marriage, then, is not just regarded as
a legal status that bestows particular entitlements on couples, but as a
unique medium through which cultural and economic status may be
marked. 61
It is not coincidental that the standard for doing a marriage "right"
emerging in both of these analyses is economic. Indeed, Frank
Furstenberg has suggested that marriage in fact perpetuates "a growing
division in American society between the haves and the have-nots.
Marriage, quite simply, is a form of having." Not only is it a form of
"having," Furstenberg claims, but it has, in effect, become "a luxury
consumer item, available only to those with the means to bring it off."62
Considering the many documented benefits associated with marriage,
Furstenberg continues, it emerges as "a cause and a consequence of
economic, cultural, and psychological stratification in American society.
The recent apparent increase in income inequality in the U.S. means that
the population may continue to sort itself between those who are eligible
for marriage and a growing number who are deemed ineligible to
marry."63
The deployment of "mental health" in the debate over same-sex
marriage has much in common with the discussion of the immersion of
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marriage in the calculus of inequality. Mental health, as used in much of
the work discussed here and elsewhere, turns out to be another kind of
durable good, something one wants to maximize because it is understood
to be a good-and perhaps prestigious-thing to have. In a society as
consumption-driven as the United States, value is often reduced to a range
of amorphous and also highly individualistic mental health variables-selfesteem, relationship satisfaction, and others. Under these conditions,
"mental health" begins to look less like an exogenous factor that can be
measured or enhanced than an element of a larger cultural preoccupation
with consumption as a marker of success.
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS

Perhaps the most alarming aspect of the current infatuation with
mental health as a charter for marriage rights is the company it condemns
gayflesbian rights advocates to keep. The marriage promotion movement,
represented by groups such as the Council on Families in America and the
Institute fo~ American V~ue:" has advanced a number of arguments in
support of I~ ~ropo~ents . VIew that legal marriage should be the only
framework Wlthm which children are born. Primary among these has been
a co~plex web of claims, outlined above, about the beneficial effects of
~arnage on everyone involved- positive physical health outcomes are
Cited,. as ~e men~ health correlations, personal safety allegedly
associated WIth marnage, and healthy results for child development.64
Those who have argued that the government should take a more
active role in promoting and supporting legal marriage have also urged
that a variety of pressures be brought to bear on those who do not fall into
line-including tax consequences, eligibility criteria for various sorts of
pub~~ support, and a revival of the stigmatization of divorce and
Jl~egJtimacy. These efforts have been realized, to some extent, in the
discourse ~urr?unding ~e "welfare reform" movement of the 1990S, which
had a major VlCt?ry WIth t~e. p~sage of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportumty Reconclhation Act of 1996: Aid to Families with
Dependent . ~hildren was transformed into Temporary Assistance for
Needy Famlhes, a measure that includes lifetime limits on eligibility for
benefits .. p~rt of the reasoning that inspired these changes is the notion
that recelVlng welfare encourages women to have children out of wedlock
and that su.ch .wom~n do not deserve public support. 65
. . . A. slmJlar hne of reasoning has been used in a number of
J~sdictions to deprive gay/lesbian individuals and couples from fostering
(m Texas, for example) or from adopting (in Florida) children no matter
how long these ~hil.dre~ have drifted in the foster-care ;ystem and
regardless of their hkelihood to secure a placement with the sort of
heterosexual family vaunted as "normal." Although there is no direct
overlap at ~resent be~een opposition to same-sex marriage and hostility
to gay/lesbian parenting, proponents of both positions tend to draw on
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similar reasoning about what sorts of families are normal and worthy of
respect.
So the question of what sorts of alliances a mental health strategy
will lead the same-sex marriage movement to adopt is perhaps the most
compelling reason to exercise caution in deploying a mental health
argument. The Bush administration's avowed commitment to promoting
marriage has emerged simultaneously with its hostility to sharing the
rewards of marriage and family with gay and lesbian citizens. It has been
tied, as well, to efforts to link eligibility for various sorts of legal and
economic benefits to heterosexual marriage, with threats to reinstitute the
status of illegitimacy for children born out of wedlock and to deny
assistance to impoverished families who fail to meet this standard. Gay
and lesbian people who support the right to marry would do well to note
these parallels and speak to them publicly.66
In the context of the highly politicized discourse over marriage now
occurring in the US, only part of which confronts demands of same-sex
couples to equal access to its benefits, "mental health" emerges as neither
specifiable nor as something that is necessarily desirable. There is no
evidence that marriage rights would enhance mental health for gay and
lesbian people and even less that attaining such rights would necessarily
be accompanied by increased tolerance and inclusiveness in the wider
society. Its deployment as a personal and societal "good" seems to me to be
solidly embedded in a particular stratum of North American (and perhaps
Western European) cultures-that which reflects the worldviews of
educated, middle- and upper-class, predominantly white people. For those
of us who do not have to struggle on a daily basis for raw survival, mental
health has become a handy gloss for a range of "goods" that we try to
maximize, goods that set the advantaged apart from a class of have-nots
who have less access to such rewards.
How we measure mental health or decide when we have it (or want
it) depends a great deal on where we are personally situated-a sense of
happiness, sexual satisfaction, adherence to standards of physical
attractiveness, an absence of known symptoms of depression or other
mental diseases- any of these may signal mental health. The more
advantaged among us are uniquely positioned at this moment in history to
use various sorts of instrumental means to achieve mental health,
particularly through access not only to drugs and therapy modalities, but
also to a host of consumer goods, the possession of which readily
translates as happiness and satisfaction in a culture focused on continual
material acquisition. Marriage, in fact, appears to be among the consumer
goods that Americans seek, at least in the context of the mental health
argument. In a culture in which "family privacy" can be used to conceal a
host of miseries, including various forms of domestic violence, are we
really willing to stake our rights on the assertion that marriage typically
enhances "mental health"?
Equal marriage rights, or any kind of equal rights for that matter,
are something else entirely-a question of civil entitlement and cultural
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citizenship-in fact, a matter of human rights. The debate over gaining
these rights should be no different from struggles of years past for freedom
from slavery, the right to vote, or legal abortion, or current battles to retain
entitlements that are in jeopardy, such as free expression and other First
Amendment rights. There are still other rights that we do not have and
which lesbian and gay citizens may seek on the same basis ~ our
<:<>J?patriots, ~?ng them national health care, an adequate standard of
hvmg f~r all ~ltizenS, and environmental policies that will prevent the
destruction of Irreplaceable. res0l?"ces. I situate marriage rights alongside
~ese other struggles-m~age nghts for same-sex couples will provide us
With access to a host of entitlements that are particularly vital for the lowincome and otherwise diseI?~owered among us, but also important to
tho~e of us W~lO are more pnvileged. They offer lesbian and gay citizens a
baSIS for making cultural claims that are meaningful to some, but not all of
us-~ ~ay to locate ourselves within families, communities, and in relation
to spmtual values, a way to order daily experience, and to achieve a basic
s~dard of personal dignity. Whether they give us more of that oh-sodesirable durable good, mental health, seems to me to be beside the point.
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